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Inside-Outside: Political Transformation  
in Burundi and its Diaspora 
 
 
Simon Turner 
Danish Institute of International Studies 
 
Introduction 
Genocide, civil war, oppressive politics and ethnic discrimination have haunted 
the small African nation, Burundi, since independence, forcing large numbers of 
its population to leave the country and live in exile. Hundreds of thousands have 
been forced to live in camps in neighbouring countries – Tanzania, Congo, and 
Rwanda – while tens of thousands have made it to Europe and North America. 
Especially Belgium, the old colonial power, has a large Burundian population. 
With such a large diaspora, politics does not just take place inside the country. The 
peasants who crossed the border to Tanzania simply in search of safety ended up 
in large part in camps that are seedbeds of political mobilization (Malkki 1995; 
Turner 2001). Meanwhile the educated elite in Europe is busy doing ‘long-
distance politics’ (Anderson 1994) lobbying with politicians, churches and NGOs 
and supporting the rebellion ‘at home’. One might therefore claim that the political 
struggle in Burundi has mostly taken place outside the borders of the nation-state 
itself.  
 
In recent years, Burundi has experienced a political transformation that gives hope 
for the future. Negotiations between the government and various opposition 
groups, often armed and often with leaders in exile, have led to a power sharing 
agreement in a transition government that eventually should lead to a new 
constitution and democratic elections. What is interesting for our purpose here is 
not only that negotiations have taken place outside the country with participants 
from Denmark, Belgium, Kenya etc. It is also interesting because many of these 
opposition leaders are now returning to Burundi after years, even decades, in exile 
and are taking up positions in the National Assembly and the government. 
Similarly ex-combatants are returning and being demobilized or integrated into the 
armed forces. Finally, some refugees who are neither political leaders nor rebels, 
are returning, hoping for a better life than in the Tanzanian camps or in Nairobi’s 
slums, although many hesitate. They are suspicious of the peace process and 
worried about the lack of security in many parts of the country. 
 
In this paper we explore what happens when the political field expands beyond the 
limits of the national borders. How does it affect the political process in the 
country? What does it mean in relation to questions of political subjectivity and 
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citizenship? Furthermore, we explore the historical changes that have taken place. 
Does the political field expand geographically during periods of political 
oppression inside the country – as was the case in the 1970s and 1980s? What 
happens when political reforms open the political debate inside the country – as is 
the present situation? Does it make the external opposition superfluous? What 
happens to the diaspora? How is the diaspora perceived from inside the country 
and how does the diaspora perceive the political situation inside the country? In 
this paper I try to see the political field from both these angles in order to 
overcome the bias that many diaspora studies have of only seeing things from the 
‘outside’. Whereas most studies explore long distance politics from the ‘long 
distance’ perspective, I try to explore them from the receiving end as well. 
 
The paper falls in three parts. First I present some ‘snapshots’ from different case 
studies, based on my ethnographic fieldwork in Bujumbura, Brussels, Nairobi and 
a Tanzanian refugee camp. With these almost synchronic snapshots the idea is to 
give a picture from different angles of the transnational political field which 
encompasses Burundi. These different snapshots illustrate that in spite of being a 
political field, it is far from being a homogeneous field.1 The second part of the 
paper takes us back in time, outlining the changing political dynamics between 
homeland and diaspora from the 1960s up till today. Finally, the third part 
attempts to draw these findings together in an analysis and draw out the theoretical 
lessons. We will discuss the mutual influence of home and exile and we will 
discuss the question of political subjectivities and the quest for political citizenship 
and its futures. 
 
Lukole: a political hot spot in the Tanzanian bush 
Lukole refugee camp is located in the far northwestern corner of Tanzania, close 
to the border with Burundi. At the time of my fieldwork there in 1997-1998 it 
hosted close to 100,000 refugees from Burundi. They were all Hutu and had fled 
the violence that broke out after the democratically elected Hutu president was 
killed in October 1993. Tens of thousands of Tutsi had been killed by Hutu and the 
Tutsi dominated army retaliated by killing just as many Hutu. Later fighting broke 
out between government forces and a Hutu rebellion. This caused even more Hutu 
to flee the country and arrive in Lukole. 
 
In the camp, refugees are taken care of by efficient humanitarian agencies. There 
is food and clean water, basic schooling and clinics. There are also special 
programmes for ‘vulnerable groups’ – the elderly, orphans, disabled, women and 
children. The refugees are treated as victims and expected to behave like so as 
                                              
1 Which is also Bourdieu’s point about the concept. It is fought over and contested and thus 
created through conflict. 
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well. This means restraining from politics which in UNHCR’s eyes is perceived as 
selfish and destructive (Turner 2001).  However, the camp is teaming with politics. 
A young man explains that he is forced to take sides with one of the two political 
parties in the camp; otherwise he is accused by both sides of supporting their 
opponent. Another young man complains that he cannot get treatment in the clinic 
because the Burundian staff there all belong to one of the two parties and only 
treat their own supporters. And a group of ‘community mobilisers’, employed by 
an NGO to support the vulnerable groups, explain that they have been forced to 
live in another part of the camp and commute to work each day because they fear 
‘men in long coats (hiding long knives)’ that claim ‘taxes’ for the other party. 
 
Not only does UNHCR discourage and disapprove of political activity in the 
camp. It is actually banned by the Tanzanian authorities, which means that all 
politics is clandestine. Although I was in the camp for more than a year and gained 
the confidence of many refugees it was only years afterwards, in May 2004, that a 
young man told me that he and his friends had been doing military training every 
day after school. I had met him as a big schoolboy in Lukole and now again in 
Nairobi as a young man, where he felt safe enough to tell me about it. 
 
Why is everyone so involved in politics? There are a number of complex reasons 
that we cannot touch upon here. But basically political ideologies offer themselves 
as the answers to people’s troubles and tribulations (Zizek 1989). They promise to 
solve existential problems. So when the Hutu arrived in Tanzania after 
experiencing traumatic events, the political ideologies explained to them why they 
were there. They gave their meaningless suffering a sense of purpose. Liisa 
Malkki writes in her famous and fascinating book (Malkki 1995) that ‘mythico-
histories’ emerge in the refugee camps in the 1980s in order to provide such 
answers to a group of people whose world has shattered. What she ignores is the 
fact that these mythico-histories were strongly linked to the political ideology of 
Palipehutu. Palipehutu had been created by the Hutu elite in exile who had chosen 
a secluded refugee camp to ‘raise the consciousness’ of the Hutu people there. To 
put it a bit crudely, Palipehutu’s main objective was to make the Hutu aware of 
their ethnicity and to demand the liberation of the Hutu people. When I did 
fieldwork in Lukole, some ten years later, Palipehutu had been partly replaced by 
another political party offering other ideological explanations. This is what caused 
the internal political conflicts in the camp. In later sections we return to the 
dynamics of these shifts in diaspora politics. 
 
The political leadership in Lukole was extremely well organized and was 
connected to politicians in Nairobi, Dar es Salaam, Belgium and Burundi. I knew 
people who would take a local bus to the nearest town and call Nairobi from the 
post office to get instructions, in spite of the enormous risks and costs involved for 
these impoverished people. 
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Brussels: living in a time pocket 
Each year on October 21st the Burundian diaspora is invited to a mass followed by 
a meeting to commemorate the death of Melchior Ndadaye, the country’s first 
democratically elected president who was killed by Tutsi officers only three 
months after being elected. There are speeches by Ndadaye’s widow and by party 
representatives and other dignitaries. 
 
This is not shared by all the diaspora, however. On the well known internet site 
www.umuco.com an invitation is posted by ‘La Diaspora de la Communauté Tutsi 
en Belgique’ to commemorate ‘the genocide against the Tutsi’ to take place 23rd 
October, 2004. After the mass there will be testimonies by survivors and finally, 
during the drinks, ‘dissemination of pictures and written documents on the 
genocide of Tutsi in Burundi.’ 
 
Similarly the genocide in 1972 is commemorated on April 6th but usually the 
Tutsi have their own commemoration for the death of the prince who was killed 
the same day. And in 2003 when I was in Brussels, a third commemoration was to 
take place because the Hutu could not agree. 
 
In Belgium, home to the largest Burundian population in Europe, people would 
always tell me, when I explained my research, that there are at least two diasporas. 
The Hutu and the Tutsi do not mix at all. They do not great in the corridors at 
Louvain La Neuve, their favourite catholic university. They do not frequent the 
same bars. Newcomers of both ethnic groups lament this state of affairs and say 
that people here are far behind what is happening in Burundi at the moment. As a 
young Hutu doing his PhD in mathematics explains, in Burundi he has Tutsi 
neighbours, Tutsi teachers, Tutsi colleagues. They have to get along. Especially in 
the capital, Bujumbura, people are fed up with ethnic fighting and try to leave it 
behind them and look forward. In Belgium, he feels that people still think very 
much in ethnic terms and he finds it difficult to make Tutsi friends because Hutu 
and Tutsi move in separate spheres.  
 
Apart from the ethnic cleavage there are cleavages among the Hutu as well. These 
are based primarily on time of arrival. I realised this when visiting the three 
principal cultural groups in Brussels. In theory, these groups are simply concerned 
with traditional drumming and dancing, and are open to all. However, it turns out 
that one has almost exclusively Tutsi members. Another has Hutu members who 
arrived in relation to the massacres in 1972 – as well as their children who often 
are born in Belgium. The last group consists primarily of Hutu who arrived after 
the troubles in 1993. Like in the refugee camp, the refugees who arrived here first 
are – broadly speaking – more ethnicist and radical in their opinions while the 
newcomers have a more nuanced view on the conflict. It seems that the longer you 
have stayed in this democratic and safe environment, the more radical your 
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opinions are. The Habermasian idea of a public sphere does not seem to apply. 
Rather, Anderson’s dystopian vision of long distance nationalism (Anderson 1994) 
seems more appropriate. 
 
Given the present peace process a few of the Hutu have returned to Burundi to 
help build the nation as they would put it. The majority have chosen to stay for the 
time being. At political meetings they would criticise the Hutu leadership in 
Burundi for giving in to the Tutsi, and they would claim that the Tutsi could still 
take power in a military coup as they had done before. In fact they believed that 
the Tutsi still held power because they controlled the army. In private 
conversations, people’s choices to stay or go were more complex and involved a 
number of human factors. A middle aged man and his wife who both are 
unemployed – in spite of him having a PhD in geology and her being a nurse - and 
live in a flat in a high rise building on the outskirts of Brussels say that they would 
return first thing there was peace. I’ll get the first plane, they say. But then they 
start reflecting more seriously on the issue. There is the question of healthcare and 
the children’s schooling. And in Burundi he might be able to get a job in the state, 
but that would be badly paid. One might be able to survive off the wages up 
country but not in Bujumbura where living is expensive. And security is bad 
outside Bujumbura. Most refugees would have similar hesitations although to 
varying degrees. They feel lonely in Brussels where everyone is so busy. In 
Bujumbura there would always be visitors, a Tutsi housewife tells me but also 
admits that it was because you had domestic servants in Bujumbura, making 
socialising easier.2 On the other hand, they are well aware that life is tough in 
terms of finding employment at the moment. Or as a successful young man who 
has been lucky to get a job as a doctor – after doing extra courses – tells me, while 
driving me home in his brand new Audi: ‘It has taken us years to get this far in 
Belgium. Why throw it all over board and start all over again?’ 
 
There is in other words a difference between the public reasons given for private 
choices to stay in Belgium in spite of political reforms in Burundi, and even 
though the present president is a Hutu. This is due to the fact that everything is 
politicised in diaspora. Every choice has to be related to political strategies – just 
like the cultural groups or the commemorations. Rather than say that they remain 
here because they have a nice house or for their children’s sake, they claim that the 
Hutu who have returned either are on the pay check of the Tutsi or are too naive to 
see that they are being tricked. In this manner, they manage publicly to uphold the 
image of themselves as political dissidents that are forced to live in exile, rather 
than being individuals who make pragmatic choices in life. 
 
                                              
2  Most of the refugees in Europe, whether Hutu or Tutsi are from the elite and used to 
comfortable lives with servants at home. 
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Another lesson to be drawn from the Belgian case is the sense that although they 
are all very keen to follow the political process, and spend a long time on the 
internet or discussing politics with each other, they somehow manage to interpret 
things according to anachronistic views, leaving them in a kind of time pocket. 
They are simply out of touch. 
 
Nairobi – a dumping ground for ‘have-beens’ 
The Burundians that I encounter in Nairobi in May 2004 are mostly young men – 
and quite a few young women – living clandestinely in Kawangware and Sattelite, 
a fairly new, semi-rural, very poor part of Nairobi. They have virtually no income 
and live with the constant threat of being stopped by the police and having to give 
a bribe or going to jail. They try to study at one of the three secondary schools for 
refugees from the Great Lakes or at the so-called ‘university’ but they can rarely 
afford the school fees. Meanwhile they all hope that they will be lucky one day. 
They hope that fortune will give them a ‘sponsor’ to study here or in Europe. Or 
they hope that the UNHCR will resettle them in Europe or the USA. They have 
put their faith in God. Their Pentecostal belief helps guide them and keep their 
spirits high while it functions as a way of keeping discipline. It makes them stay 
away from sex, alcohol and gambling. Although they help each other like brothers 
through the hard times, their projects are strictly personal. It is not a political – let 
alone military – solution they seek.  
 
Not that Nairobi always has been this way. There used to be many politicians 
living here. It was the junction between the camps and the elite in Europe. It was 
here that meetings were arranged, arms deals were sealed, and plans conceived. 
Everyone came through Nairobi on their way from A to B. Now most of the 
politicians have returned to good positions in the Burundian government. There 
were many jokes, while I was there, about the so-called officers who returned to 
become officers in the Burundian army. Most of them did not know one end of a 
gun from the other but saw their chance of cutting a deal and getting a good 
position in Burundi. The few politicians who are left in Nairobi either belong to 
the last rebel group that refuses to join the negotiations3 or are in Nairobi for other 
reasons. They have meetings and write declarations but are aware that their role is 
minor.  
 
The young born again men hesitate between staying and returning. This is because 
in spite of Nairobi being a tough place to live, they are well aware that life will 
also be tough on them in Burundi – and the idea of Nairobi being a metropolis is 
very important to them. Their main reason for being there is in their own words 
‘communication’. They also fear returning – often for good reasons. Young Hutu 
                                              
3 I met two representatives of Agathon Rwasa’s faction of Palipehutu. 
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men who have been in exile are often considered rebels or genociders by those 
who remained. And most of these boys have been involved in the rebellion one 
way or another before becoming born again Christians. 
 
Bujumbura- the pragmatics of real politics 
I had been given the directions to Ngendakumana’s house in Mutanga Nord but 
got lost on the way anyway. This is an area where massive new houses are 
shooting up along the mountain side. It is not as classy as the old villas that lie 
further south, where the established elite live but it is still a far cry from the run 
down townships below the hillside; Cibitoke and Kamenge where the majority of 
Bujumbura’s population lives. The roads are potholed but the walls around the 
villas are huge. People jokingly call this area ‘le quartier d’Arusha,’ alluding to the 
fact that it is financed by the handsome per diems that these politicians received 
during the lengthy peace negotiations in Arusha. ‘Why do you think the 
negotiations dragged on for so long?’ they say. However, among ordinary 
Burundians there seems to be no more animosity towards the returned politicians 
than towards any other politicians. Politicians are generally believed to be 
‘ventriotes’ – only interested in filling their own bellies.  
 
I finally find his house by sighting the South African soldiers outside. Like all 
returned politicians he has guards from the South African Defence Force 24 hours 
a day. This was agreed in the Arusha accords and a prerequisite for Hutu 
politicians to return. They simply do not trust the government forces after what 
happened to ‘their president’ in 1993. Ngendakumana seats me in a room that has 
enough sofas around the walls for about 25 people. There is no other furniture. 
One can imagine how these rooms serve an important function as meeting places. 
He is also waiting other visitors and is busy coordinating on his mobile phone. He 
used to stay in Belgium and is a member of one of the last rebel factions to have 
signed a peace agreement with the transition government. The party leader is still 
in Dar es Salaam, while Ngendakumana is his porte parole and has only been here 
in Burundi a short while. 
 
Nahimana is another returned refugee now in the National Assembly. I visit him in 
his ‘home’. It is a small, newly built hotel-apartment where he lives alone. This is 
obviously a temporary solution, as he has left his wife and children in Ringsted, 
Denmark. He is a Tutsi himself but a member of Frodebu and has always been a 
strong critic of the ancien regime. Just like the refugees who are still in Belgium 
weighing the pros and cons of returning, the choice for people like Nahimana and 
Ngendakumana has not been straight forward. Many returning politicians leave 
their families abroad. Perhaps they do no quite have faith in the peace process that 
they are part of. They actually admit that they sometimes negotiate solutions 
without having 100% confidence in the solution. So they are waiting to see what 
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the future may bring before jeopardising the safety of their families. Fleeing the 
country alone is after all easier than as a family. There are also more pragmatic 
reasons. Butasi is a member of the National Assembly who has lived in camps in 
Zaire, then in Tanzania and finally in Amsterdam where he stayed for two years 
but was never granted asylum. When in Holland, he sent money to his wife in the 
camp, so that she could go to Lusaka. He returned in February 2002 and has 
brought his wife and smallest children from Lusaka but left the oldest there. She 
has followed the English language school system and is finishing her secondary 
school. He does not know where to send her to university. ‘It is so expensive in 
Zambia,’ he explains. 
 
In spite of the pragmatic circumstances around choosing to return, they see their 
choice as part of a heroic deed – a duty that History has given them. They have to 
return to help rebuild their country – whatever the personal costs. In their 
discourse they are in other words sacrificing themselves for the common good – 
running the risk of being killed, having to live with armed guards all the time, 
living separated from their closest family. They see the ones who remained in 
Europe as selfish and comfortable, although they would not put it so strongly. 
 
When talking about the politicians in Europe they agree that they are very radical 
and uncompromising. ‘It is easy just to criticise when you are sitting comfortably 
in Belgium,’ they say. 4   ‘But here we have to find solutions. We must 
compromise. That is what politics is about. You cannot achieve anything without 
compromise.’ In the words of Butasi who puts the blame on ‘democracy and 
liberty’: ‘In Belgium you can say whatever you want without it having 
consequences – neither for your security nor for political decisions. Here things 
are more delicate. Here, you have a big responsibility. Your words have 
consequences. So you have to compromise.’ One would think this man had read 
Anderson! He goes on to explain that politicians here are ‘partenaires’ while those 
that are ‘there’ just criticise. But it takes time to adapt and gain this attitude of 
reconciliation; he says and claims that he has also changed his opinions and 
approach after returning. The reason behind this, he claims, is that the Burundians 
in Europe get their information via the internet, by phone etc. ‘but they prefer to 
believe the news that they get from the rebels rather than what we tell them. The 
internet is their Bible!’ 
 
The political leadership in Bujumbura is well aware of the power of the diaspora – 
to which many of them used to belong – and the president and other high ranking 
                                              
4 Belgium is perceived to be the worst place for in-fighting and radical politics, because it is so 
closely linked to Burundi. Nahimana says ‘to live in Belgium is like living in Burundi.’ That is 
why he chose Denmark. In other words, it seems to have brought all the divisions from Burundi 
with it but not the imperative to negotiate. 
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politicians regularly meet the diaspora in Europe in an attempt to have a dialogue 
and ‘soften’ them. 
 
This picture of the reconciliatory politics in Bujumbura is not all glossy, however. 
Several Tutsi groups – such as Action Contre Génocide, PA Amasekanye, and a 
faction of Uprona – see the returning Hutu politicians as génocidaires who 
planned a genocide against the Tutsi in 1993. Some would go so far as to say that 
they kidnapped and killed their own president as a pretext to unleash the genocide 
on the Tutsi. For these Tutsi groups it is not only the returning Hutu that are bad 
for the country. Anything coming from the outside is considered a threat to 
national sovereignty. Thus they were against negotiations taking place outside 
Burundi, they are against the deployment of foreign peacekeeping troops and they 
are against an international tribunal. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explain 
this discourse but it is related to a general, strong anti-colonialism that has been 
central to the Tutsi regimes ideology since independence (Turner 2001), and finds 
expression in paranoid conspiracy theories about the Catholic Church and Belgium 
using the Hutu in order to divide and rule the country.  
 
From another perspective, Hutu politicians who remained in the country during all 
the ‘dark years’ find that the returnees are taking all the limelight. They feel that 
they struggled and suffered most, while the leaders in Europe had an easy life 
where they did not risk being jailed or killed for their opinions. Now the exiles 
have come back and taken all the attention due to their good connections, while 
those who suffered the most are not acknowledged. 
 
In sum, there are many perspectives on the role of exiles, stayees and returnees 
respectively, depending on which angle one sees them from. The difficult personal 
choices in relation to a transition period which could result in peace and prosperity 
but could equally end in genocide and war are inserted into political discourses. 
The perception of returnees range from anything from opportunists who want a 
piece of the peace cake, over naive pawns in the Tutsi game, to heroes who are 
rebuilding the nation or génocidaires who have conned the international 
community into letting them into power again. Similarly, the diaspora can be seen 
as sensible people who can see things clearer from a distance and therefore see the 
dangers in the so-called peace process or radicals who are out of touch and simply 
read their own internet sites, reconfirming their own prejudiced views. 
 
Burundi’s transnational political field: a historical overview 
As the case studies above show, Burundi’s political field extends beyond the 
national borders of the territory of the state. Refugees and emigrants engage in 
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long distance politics5, trying to influence the political situation at home in various 
ways. In Tanzania they train young men and send them across the border to fight. 
Nairobi used to be the coordination hub, connecting the region to Europe, and the 
elite in Europe have the financial means and the freedom of speech to function as 
spokespersons of their party in relation to the ‘international community’. They 
lobby host societies in a manner of ways from approaching national politicians to 
performing dances at cultural events and informing school children about their 
country and its problems. The Burundi Committee in Denmark (Burundikomitéen) 
is illustrative. Being founded by Danish Baptists who have had missionary 
activities in Burundi since the 1920s, this small organisation with only ten 
members (roughly half Danish and half Burundian) used its connection to a 
Baptist member of the Danish parliament to arrange a meeting with the 
parliamentary committee of foreign affairs. The chairman of the Burundi 
Committee, himself a Baptist, happens also to be the chairman of Palipehutu. 
Likewise, internet sites are often hosted in Denmark (Agora, SOS-Burundi), 
Canada (BurundiYouthCouncil.com) and of course Belgium (ARIB.org, Burundi-
realities, etc). It is also clear from the cases that the situation is changing now and 
that the diaspora has to find new ways of relating to the homeland. 
 
In order to understand firstly how various diaspora groups emerged and secondly 
how they have changed, we need to explore the shifting political field in Burundi. 
Burundi is said to be comprised of three ethnic groups; the Hutu (85%), the Tutsi 
(14%) and a small group of marginalised Twa (1%). The figures may not be exact 
and there is doubt whether one can actually talk of ethnic groups rather than casts 
or classes. However, the groups are ‘real’ in the sense that hundreds of thousands 
of people have been killed in Burundi in the name of ethnicity. The Tutsi were 
privileged during first German and later Belgian rule. They were seen as rulers 
while the Hutu were considered by the Europeans to be best suited for manual 
labour. Shortly after independence a small group of low-caste Tutsi from a certain 
region monopolised political power in the country, breaking with the traditional 
elite and introducing a strongly modernist and anti-colonial ideology. They 
followed a double-sided policy of keeping power tightly in the hands of a small 
Tutsi elite while claiming that ethnicity was invented by the colonial 
administration in order to divide and rule the Burundian people.6 Burundians were 
essentially one people, according to official discourse, and mention of ethnicity 
was banned in the 1970s. 
 
In 1972 a small Hutu revolt in the southern part of the country resulted in massive 
retaliation by government troops that systematically killed up to 150,000 Hutu, 
                                              
5 For a discussion of this concept see: Anderson (1994), Schiller, Basch et al (1994), Appadurai 
(1996), Axel, etc. 
6 See Lemarchand (1970, 1996) and Turner (2001, 2004). 
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mostly the educated (down to secondary school) and the elite who were assumed 
to be behind the plot.7 This watershed event forced hundreds of thousands of Hutu 
into exile. In the camps in Tanzania they tried to comprehend what had hit them, 
as mentioned earlier. People who had not previously identified themselves with 
ethnic labels became acutely aware of their Hutuness. They realised that they had 
been targeted and forced to flee due to their ethnicity. Therefore a major task of 
these refugees, led by Palipehutu, was to combat the government’s ideology of 
‘one nation one people’. They insisted on the essential differences between what 
they saw as different races and on the long historical roots of the conflict between 
Hutu and Tutsi which, according to them, dated back to the 14th century when 
Tutsi invaded the country from the North and subjugated the peaceful autochthon 
Hutu.8 
 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the one party state controlled civil society down 
to the slightest detail, monitoring and punishing any descent (Laely 1997). With 
such a limited room for political resistance inside the country, opposition politics 
was formulated in camps in Tanzania, among a young Hutu elite in Habyarimana’s 
‘Hutu dominated’ Rwanda and among a small Hutu elite in Belgium and 
elsewhere in Europe. The vice-president of Palipehutu was based in Denmark and 
took over the leadership when the first president of the party, based in Tanzania, 
died in 1989. 
 
In the late 1980s the political situation in Burundi began changing. Due in part to 
pressure from donors to introduce ‘good governance’ and in part from Palipehutu 
which had begun to infiltrate the country from Rwanda and Tanzania. Party cadres 
were mobilising the Hutu population in the countryside and in 1990 launched a 
surprise attack on Bujumbura airport. The press was given more freedom and a 
new constitution was adopted in 1992. This constitution mentions that Burundi is 
made up of several population components, thereby indirectly admitting that there 
are several ethic groups in the country (Reyntjens 1995, 9). The same year, 
political parties were legalised, as long as they were not based on region, ethnicity 
or religion, thereby excluding Palipehutu. Meanwhile Frodebu, a moderate ‘Hutu 
party’ with several Tutsi in the leadership, managed to avoid mention of ethnicity 
and emphasised democracy and human rights and won a landslide victory in June 
1993. However, the optimism did not last long, as the elected president, Melchior 
Ndadaye, was – as I have mentioned earlier – kidnapped and assassinated in what 
Filip Reyntjens has called history’s most successful failed coup. 
 
What did this mean for the diaspora and the transnational political field? In 
Belgium the small group of radical Hutu with Marxist and revolutionary 
                                              
7 For a detailed analysis, see Lemarchand and Martin (1974). 
8 See Malkki (1995) for some fabulous examples of these mythico-histories. 
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inclinations were joined in the late 1980s by a number of Hutu post graduate 
students who were in Belgium on government grants. At first there was mutual 
suspicion between them, as the old refugees were convinced that these Hutu were 
‘turncoats’ at best and spies for the regime at worst. One of these students from 
that era tells me how he had almost expected the exiled politicians in Belgium to 
have horns from the incredible stories he had heard about them.9 With the reforms 
in the early nineties some Hutu returned from neighbouring countries as did a few 
from Europe, and the political field moved back into Burundi were a lively debate 
was taking place.  
 
Many remained in exile, however, sceptical of the process. These people were 
unfortunately proven right by the events, following the assassination of the 
president where some 30,000 Tutsi civilians were killed by angry Hutu and equal 
numbers of Hutu were killed in the army clamp down. Now these people say: 
‘what did I say’ and use it as a reason for not having faith in the present peace 
process. Pascal, who was a student in Belgium at the time, went back to Burundi 
for a visit in October 1993. He thanks God today that he had a return ticket and a 
visa to Belgium in his hand. He returned to Belgium and sought asylum. He dare 
not return now in case the same happens. Now he does not have the return ticket 
and the visa. 
 
Following the violence in 1993, Hutu guerrilla movements appeared in early 1994. 
According to some accounts that sound quite reliable (e.g. interview with ex-
president Ntibantunganye, June 2003), the rebellion started spontaneously in 
several parts of the country. Only later did the overall leadership, which was made 
up of Frodebu leaders in neighbouring countries, take over the command of the 
rebellion. This is a tumultuous period in Burundi’s history. As opposed to the 
1970s and 1980s, political debate does take place inside the country but the 
security situation is bad and too open mouthed critics disappear or leave the 
country.  
 
The deteriorating security situation also results in a deteriorating economy. 
Peasants no longer plant crops for fear of having to leave before harvest or of 
having it stolen by rebels or government forces. The only economy that flourishes 
is the contraband economy, run by the political and military oligarchy. This 
situation of economic stagnation means that also a number of young Tutsi start 
leaving the country and seeking asylum in Europe and North America. This group 
of young Tutsi and a similar group of Hutu blur the borderline between refugees 
                                              
9 Several of these old Palipehutu founders with whom I have talked would also emphasise this 
reputation that they had gained. In fact they enjoyed telling how unknowing foreigners – 
preferably Tutsi – would startle when they realised that the gentleman, they were sitting next to 
was actually the leader of Palipehutu. It is as if it gives them some secret power to have such a 
mythical status. 
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and economic migrants. They are less radical politically and in general less 
interested in politics altogether. Rather than directing their frustrations into 
political projects, they are adventurers seeking individual success. In this way we 
might question whether they are part of the diaspora at all. 
 
In 2000 a large number of political parties and movements signed the Arusha 
Accords that had been mediated by Julius Nyerere and later by Nelson Mandela. 
Even Bill Clinton had used his political weight to push the last signatures through. 
November 1st 2001 marked the beginning of a three year transition period which in 
the last minute has been extended for another six months due to problems in 
carrying out national elections in the countryside. As we could see from the case 
studies above, the diaspora is in many ways superfluous in this situation. While 
one of their main raisons d’être was to provide reliable alternative information, 
unrestricted by government censorship, their information now seems out of 
touch.10 
 
Conclusion: a transnational political field in flux or dissolution? 
This paper has attempted to illustrate the continuous and complex relationships 
between homeland and diaspora. Once people leave Burundian soil, they do not 
necessarily leave Burundi. On the contrary, during periods of political exclusion, it 
was necessary to leave the territory in order to enter the political field – at least if 
one did not simply follow the party line of the one party state.  
 
The diaspora has had an enormous influence on the political process in Burundi. It 
is impossible to measure such influence, as it covers a whole range of factors that 
cannot be quantified. The most tangible influence is, obviously, the armed 
rebellion, using bases in Congo and Tanzania, allying with various militias from 
Rwanda and Congo and sending young men from camps. The influence of 
lobbying activity in Europe is harder to assess. As is the influence that internet 
sites might have on public opinion abroad and at home. When for instance, 
agora.com was banned in Burundi in 2002 because it allegedly incited ethnic 
hatred, a Tutsi in Denmark decided to host it in Denmark. He claims that it is not 
because he is radical but because he believes in the right to expression. 
 
                                              
10 However, many of them still believe that they have access to ‘the truth’. Those who are in 
Burundi have been fooled, they maintain, into believing that they have freedom of expression and 
unbiased news. This situation is in fact more dangerous than in the 1980s where the Tutsi so 
obviously showed their oppressive side. Now the Tutsi have constructed a facade of openness and 
democracy, while hiding their true intentions and thus keeping the key to ‘real’ power (see also 
Turner 2004, 2005). In exile, they can keep their head clear and see through these conspiracies, 
they believe. 
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There are influences the other way as well. As we have seen in the historical 
overview, changes in the political field inside Burundi have forced the diaspora to 
redefine itself. In the 1980s Palipehutu gained strength, vindicating a discourse of 
ethno-national liberation. With the reforms in the early nineties, however, the 
regime partially accepted the idea of ethnicity, rendering Palipehutu without a 
cause. Instead a group of young intellectual Hutu who had studied in Rwanda set 
the agenda as moderates, calling for democracy rather than liberation. Similar 
changes are taking place presently.  
 
The question is whether it makes sense at all to talk about the homeland affecting 
the diaspora and vice versa. With a diaspora so dispersed, living in very different 
conditions – from refugee camps to clandestine lives in Nairobi to doctors in 
Belgium – and so politically split, the affects are bound to be equally divergent. 
Perhaps it is more fruitful to think of it as a single political field that happens to be 
spread, geographically, over several continents; a transnational political field. 
There are thus discrepancies in opinions but everyone engages in the same field – 
which is the whole point of Bourdieu’s concept of the political field. It is through 
these struggles that the field is created. 
 
This said I am not implying that national boundaries are irrelevant. We might see 
certain diasporic groups living in ‘time pockets’. Especially in periods where the 
political field expands inside the national borders, those left outside are no longer 
central actors in defining the struggle and the field. They tend to create self-
perpetuating circuits of political reason like leftovers from another era. I have not 
been able to go into detail in this paper on the issue of mutual positioning in the 
political field. It has, however, emerged from the cases that political entrepreneurs 
discredit each other according to where they are located in the transnational 
political field. In rough lines, those in North America and Europe are accused by 
those inside the country of being ‘out of touch with reality’ while those inside 
Burundi are perceived of by the diaspora as being ‘blinded by power and position’. 
In other words, while the inside and the outside conflate in transnational political 
practice, the idea of the inside versus the outside is upheld as a significant 
differentiating principle in the game of political positioning. 
 
The paper also raises important questions on the role of the nation-state and 
political citizenship within it. Involving oneself in politics as a great many 
Burundians abroad do, is to claim political citizenship rights11 to the nation-state. 
Being in exile one is in a sense excluded from such full rights but then again those 
who fled did so because they did not enjoy full political citizenship in the first 
place. This is certainly the view of the Hutu who first fled the country. They felt 
                                              
11 As opposed to formal/legal citizenship. 
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like second rate citizens. To engage in politics abroad is a means for them to lay 
claims on the state. 
 
With the recent changes in Burundi this might be changing – and here I am not 
simply referring to the turning of the tables; including the Hutu in the state and 
giving them full political citizenship. What is more interesting is the way politics 
itself is being transformed and perhaps being voided of power – like elsewhere in 
Africa. While the once exiled Hutu are now returning in numbers to build houses 
with the money from Arusha and take up posts in the state, young, urban, educated 
Tutsi and Hutu no longer dream of a future as a civil servant. Whereas the first 
generation of educated Africans in the newly independent African states strived 
for white collar jobs in the modern sector – especially the civil service – the crisis 
of legitimacy of the state and the general economic crisis compounded with 
structural adjustment plans to ‘slim down’ government expenditure has taken 
away the former glory of such careers. In Burundi, it was previously the privilege 
of the Tutsi elite to get such positions. But now the times are changing and it 
seems that by an ironic twist of (mis-)fortune the Hutu have arrived too late.  
 
The youth can see that jobs in the political system lead to nowhere. They want to 
move into private business which has limited possibilities as well. But then there is 
always the option of getting a job with one of the international NGOs that have 
invaded the country in recent years. Alternatively, they dream of getting to Europe 
or North America in search of a better life. In Copenhagen and Brussels you see 
them earning money or doing business studies. They might be interested in politics 
and even active in an NGO but they also want a career. They are fed up with the 
middle aged men who hold PhD degrees in some obscure subject but cannot (they 
almost imply: will not) get a job and instead sit around on welfare complaining 
about the government in Burundi without doing anything constructive about it. 
These ambitious young men and women (for there are many women among them) 
do not pity them. 
 
As opposed to the politically active these young people are not claiming political 
citizenship – whether they live in or outside the country. They just want to ‘get on 
with things’ – in line with our present post-political, neo-liberal day and age. 
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